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ABSTRACT 
The concept of knowledge or belief so important in Artificial Intelligence (AI) has 
been discussed in depth by philosophers, exemplified by Giirdenfors [1]. Whereas it is 
useful to have a broad view on the topic, it is also necessary tolook at concrete models 
(eg, numerical modeling of degrees of belie]). In this paper, we will discuss the cautious 
aspect of Shafer's approach to belief modeling and investigate conditionals in the 
context of belief dynamics. In particular, we show that Dempster's rule of conditioning 
produces the least committed belief function among the set of belief functions generated 
by conditional objects, thus providing ajustification for its use. 
KEYWORDS:  Belief unctions, transferable belief model, dynamics of belief 
states, conditional objects, Dempster's rule of conditioning 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Central to the uncertainty management in intelligent systems is a theory 
of  rational changes of  belief. A theory of states of knowledge (epistemic 
states) and their dynamics is proposed (G~irdenfors [1], see also Clarke [2]). 
Besides various contributions to the topic, an interesting feature of 
G~irdenfors' work is to relate belief dynamics to conditionals (ie, 
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"I f . . .  then. . . "  rules that occur in natural anguage). Because rules that 
have exceptions or apply by default as well as incomplete information are 
of considerable interest in Artificial Intelligence (AI), various "conditional 
logics" have been advocated (see Clarke [2]). The main tendency seems to 
be that conditionals ack truth values, hence acceptance conditions hould 
replace truth conditions in the investigation of conditional logics for AI. 
In view of the recent development of a theory of measure-free condi- 
tional events 1 (Goodman, Nguyen and Walker [3]), we will re- 
examine the tendency above in this paper, especially in the direction of 
belief revision. Although it is useful to have a broad view on the concept of 
epistemic states, it is also necessary to look at concrete models such as 
numerical models for degrees of belief. (Bayesian and belief models). 
Special attention is paid to Shafer's approach to modeling of degrees of 
belief (Shafer [4]) and Dempster's rule of conditioning under the "open 
world assumption" as emphasized in the transferable belief model (Smets 
[5, 6]). 
We point out that Shafer's approach is a form of cautious modeling of 
belief. This fact is reflected in two places: (1) the expected utility with 
respect o a belief function (ie, Choquet integral) corresponds to a pes- 
simistic strategy; and (2) in belief revision, Dempster's rule of conditioning 
leads to the construction of the belief function that is the least committed 
belief function among the set of belief functions generated by conditional 
objects. 
In section 2, we will first outline some facts about conditionals needed 
for later studies. Section 3 is devoted to a reformulation of the so-called 
Ramsey test of conditionals as well as various aspects of conditional logics. 
In section 4, we reexamine Shafer's approach to belief modeling as well as 
the minimum commitment principle (Smets [7]). Section 5 is about the 
concept of expected utility with respect o belief functions. Finally, in 
section 6, we show that the belief function derived by the application of 
Dempster's rule of conditioning under the open world assumption is the 
least committed belief function among the set of belief functions gener- 
ated by conditional events. 
2. CONDITIONALS AND PROBABILITIES 
The problem of quantifying " I f . . .  then. . . "  rules is important for infer- 
ence networks as well as for conditional logics. To be concrete, we will use 
These conditional events are said to be measure-free asthey are defined without he aid of 
probability measures. 
On Dynamics of Cautious Belief and Conditional Objects 91 
set-notation in this paper, in view of Stone's representation theorem for 
abstract Boolean algebras. 
Let ~ be a Boolean algebra of subsets of a set fl. The empty set is 
denoted by 0.  Set operations and relations are: 
(.): negation, set-complement; 
N: conjunction, set-intersection; 
U: disjunction, set-union; 
_c : set-inclusion; 
: material implication, B ~ A = B U A 
By conditionals, we mean sentences of the form "If  B then A," denoted 
byB ~A.  
Lewis' triviality result concerning Stalnaker's thesis (see Lewis [8]) states 
that except for trivial cases, there is no binary Boolean operation * such 
that P(A * B) = P(A n B)/P(B), where P is a (finitely additive) proba- 
bility measure on ~¢2. 
This result should not be viewed as a negative one, in the sense that one 
cannot define the probabilities of conditionals as conditional probabilities. 
Rather it merely says "if we want to assign conditional probabilities to 
conditionals, then conditionals are not elements of d . "  The search for a 
"home" for conditional objects B ~ A has led to a theory of measure-free 
conditional events (eg, Goodman, Nguyen, and Walker [3]). Below, we 
recall some facts in this theory needed for other sections (Goodman, 
Nguyen, and Walker [3]) for details. 
A suitable form for a conditional object "if B then A" is given by any of 
the following equivalent "intervals" in ~¢: 
[A NB, B--)A],[A AB, BUA] ,{X~J :A  ABc_Xc_BuA},  
((A nB) ux:xc } 
This interval is denoted, from now on, by (AIB). 
When B --- 1-1, we identify (AIIq) = {A} with A, so that propositions 
(~¢) are special cases of conditional propositions. The collection of all 
conditional objects (or events) is denoted as ~'1~ ¢. 
Note that a conditional proposition is a collection of propositions. Now 
the question is to know if it is possible to use the classical definition of 
conditional probabilities to quantify the probability of our conditional 
2 We define PB(A) as the ratio P(A n B)/P(B) to emphasize that this value is the 
probability of A in the context of B. 
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objects. This can be achieved indeed. For any probability measure P on ~¢, 
one can extend it to P on ~¢1~' without ambiguity: 
P(A  n B) 
P: [0, 1], P ( (A iB) )  = , when P(B) > O. 
P(B) 
Indeed, the absence of ambiguity results from the fact that equivalent 
conditional objects receive the same probability. Suppose (AIB) = (CID), 
both in ~¢1z¢, ie, [An  B, B U A] = [C n D, D u C]. Then, by equality of 
intervals, we have A OB=COD and BUA =DUC.  If we write 
U A asa  disjoint union B U (An  B), then it follows that B = D, 
because D U C = D u (C N D). Thus PB(A) = P (A  n B) /P (B)  = P(C 
n D) /P (D)  = Po(C), or equivalently •((AIB)) = P((CID)). 
Note that the space zg[~ of conditional propositions is strictly larger 
than ~'. With the logical operations induced by intervals, ~1~ ¢ is an 
algebraic system more general than a Boolean algebra. 
From the above facts, we can write "A given B" as (AIB), which is a 
mathematical entity. 
3. ON THE RAMSEY TEST AND TRUTH-CONDITIONS OF 
CONDITIONALS 
For background on dynamics of belief states as well as the Ramsey test, 
we refer the reader to chapter 7 of G~irdenfors' book (G~irdenfors [1]). 
Again as in section 2, let so' be a Boolean algebra representing proposi- 
tions. In general, a belief set is a subset K of .~', where K is the set of 
"believed" propositions. For B ~ ~¢, let Kn denote the belief set obtained 
from K by revision by B, 3 (by some specified belief revision process). In a 
sense, conditionals are related to belief dynamics via the Ramsey test: 
B=*A~K if and only i fA  ~K 8. 
(ie, B =* A belongs to K iff whenever K has been revised such that it 
includes B, then it includes A). 
We are going to re-examine this test in Bayesian models. Recall that a 
Bayesian model for modeling degrees of belief is a probability measure P
on 5,¢. For given P, the belief set K generated by P is: 
K = {A ~g:  P (A)  = 1}. 
3 We denote by K B what Gfrdenfors [1] denotes as K~. 
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Also because the belief revision process in Bayesian models is specified by 
a conditional probability measure: 
e,: [0, H, 
we have 
KB 
P(A N B) 
PB(A) for P (B)  > O, 
P(B) 
= {A ~.~': PB(A) = 1}. 
In the Ramsey test, the condition B ~ A ~ K is an acceptance ondition, 
and it is defined in terms of a change of belief states through the revision 
process leading to K 8. More importantly, this acceptance condition forces 
the conditional B = A to bean  element of the Boolean algebra sO, 
because K _c~¢. But if B ~ A ~,  then it has truth values (T or F)  and 
the reason to replace truth-conditions by acceptance condition in the 
attempt o define semantics for conditionals is precisely the fact that 
conditionals lack truth values! Also Stalnaker's thesis (Stalnaker [9]), 
"assign conditional probabilities to conditionals," namely fails because the 
condition B ~ A ~ K cannot be met. It is correct to suggest hat some 
extended language should be imagined to extend ~¢ in which the condi- 
tional connective lives, rather than exclude conditionals as members of 
belief sets. In a sense, information or knowledge is conditional in nature, 
so that knowledge states could contain conditionals. 
Now, in view of section 2, we do have a concrete "extended language," 
namely the space ~¢1~¢ of conditional objects. Thus, let P be a probability 
measure on ~ and P its extension to ~ J~ defined in section 2. Let us 
redefine the belief set K c_~lzV associated with P as: 
K = {(XIY) ~¢1~:  P((XIY))  = 1} = {(XIY) c~¢1~': Py(X)  = 1} 
The revised belief set K B _c~l~' is defined as: 
K ,  = {(XIY) ~¢1~¢: Ps((XIY))  = 1} 
= {(XIY) ~¢1~¢: Psny(X)  = 1} 
We reformulate the Ramsey test as: 
(AIB) ~ K if and only if (AJf l) ~ K B 
ie, (AIB) c K iff PB(A) = 1. 
4. CAUTIOUS MODELING OF DEGREES OF BELIEF 
As suggested by G~irdenfors [1] and emphasized in Smets [10], each 
belief model should contain two components: tatics and dynamics. The 
statics component consists of proposing a way to represent states of belief 
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such as a numerical-valued set-function to quantify degrees of belief. The 
dynamics part consists of specifying, say, a belief revision process. In this 
section and the next, we discuss the statics component of the Transferable 
Belief Model (Smets [10]), and in section 6, we discuss its dynamics 
component. 
The static component of the transferable belief model is not mathemati- 
cally different from the one described in random sets theory (Nguyen [11]) 
or in Dempster's model of lower probabilities (Dempster [12]). The differ- 
ence between these models is more conceptual as they model different 
problems. They "diverge" mathematically once the dynamic part is consid- 
ered. 
It is often if not always held, up to recent years, that probabilities are 
rational degrees of belief. This view corresponds to Bayesian models, in 
which the dynamics component is always taken to be conditionalization via 
conditional probability measures. Shafer's approach is an extension of the 
Bayesian view. Mathematically speaking, the extension of probability mea- 
sures into belief functions (as models of belief states) took place precisely 
at the level of H. Poincar6's formula, 4 which is equivalent to the additivity 
property of probability measures. Specifically, the equality in H. Poincar6's 
formula is weaken to inequality for belief functions. A striking analogy 
with the history of probability theory is as follows: whereas the concept of 
Lebesgue measure led to abstract measures in which normalized, non- 
negative measures are taken to be probability measures, a similar situation 
happened with the work of Choquet on capacities (see eg, Choquet [13]): a 
special class of Choquet's capacities, namely monotone of infinite order 
capacities, are taken to be belief functions, ie, to model someone's belief. 
In fact, belief functions can be seen also as distribution functions of 
random sets (see eg, Hestir et al. [14]). 
A possible but highly naive way to arrive at axioms for belief functions is 
described below. As in probability theory, where one can start at an 
intuitive and elementary level with finite probability spaces and the con- 
cept of ratios of favorable cases over possible cases, to arrive at some basic 
indications for laws governing the concept of chance, one can do exactly 
the same thing for belief functions. Thus, we consider a finite set ®, 
representing a collection of "states of nature," one of which is the true 
state 0 0 (closed world assumption). Suppose we have a finite collection of 
"experts" or "observers" ~ (as in Information Theory) such that each 
e ~ 8" can specify (localize) 00 to be within a subset S(e)--/: Q of O. 
Suppose also that we can only base our belief in any set A __c O (that 
4 PioncarE's formula: For any n > 0, for any A 1 . . . . .  A~ in 2 ° ,  and for any probability 
measures on O, P(A  l t2 A 2 . . .  u A n) = F_, t c_ {1.'2 . . . . .  n} (_  1)111+ I p (  Ni ~ t A i )  
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00 a A) on experts' opinion. To be cautious, we take into account only the 
e such that S(e) c_ A that is, we are not willing_to take the risk to consider 
that 00~AwhenS(e)nA ~ O but S(e) A A ~ 0.  
If we view reliability of all experts as equal, then our cautious modeling 
of degree of belief in A can be taken as: 
I{e ~8": S(e) ___A}I 
F(A)  = 18'1 ' 
where IA[ denotes the cardinality of A. 
First, this set-function on the power set of 19, denoted as 2 ° , satisfies 
F (Q)  = 0, F (®)  = 1 (closed world assumption) (1) 
A subset A of O is called a "focal element" (in this setting) if there exists 
some e ~ 8' such that S(e) = A. If we let m: 2 ° ---, [0, 1] with: 
I{e ~ g': S(e) = A}I 
re(A) = Ig'l ' 
then m(A) > 0 if and only if A is a focal element. 
Moreover, Y'-,4 ~_om(A) = 1 and 
F( A) = Y'~ m( X)  (2) 
Xc_A 
Because m is a probability density on 2 e, we can associate with it a formal 
probability measure: P,. on 2 2", the power set of 2e: 
P,.(A) = Y'. m(X)  fo rAsubseto f2  e. 
X~A 
Thus 
F(B)  = Pm(2n), for B ~ 2 e and 2 B denotes the set of subsets of B (3) 
From this relation with probability, we deduce that: 
For any n > 0, for any A 1 . . . . .  A n in 2 e, 
E( -1 ) l t l+ lF (N ie lA i )  < F(A  1 UA 2 ... UA , )  (4) 
1 
where the summation is over the set of I such that O 4: I c {1, 2 , . . . ,  n}. 
Note that in the literature, a belief function F on a finite set 19 is 
defined by (2) with the mass function m being specified formally as a 
probability density on 2 ° . The inequality (4) seems cumbersome, but it is 
simply a consequence of (3). Because (4) and (1) are equivalent o (3), 
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there is no harm to use them as axioms, when axioms should be put solely 
on F for extension to arbitrary O (see again Hestir et al. [4]). 
Whether or not human belief behaves like such F is open to debate. It 
is, however, a generalization of Bayesian models. Moreover, the above F 
reflects a form of cautious modeling of belief. This aspect of cautious 
modeling will be more apparent when examining a generalized expectation 
concept and the rule of conditioning (sections 5 and 6). 
As a concrete situation where F is defined in terms of m, consider the 
following: 
Suppose that the probabilistic knowledge about O is specified by the 
values of a probability measure P0 only on a partition of O, ie, Po(Oi) = a i, 
i -- 1 . . . . .  n where {01 . . . . .  O n} forms a partition of O. Note that if each O i 
is a singleton, then P0 is completely known. 
Define the function m: 2 n ~ [0, 1] by 
m(A)  = ol i if A = O i 
0 otherwise 
Then F(A)  = EX~_Arn(X)  is the best lower approximation of Po(A) ,  in 
light of the given evidence. 
Recall that the rationality of Bayesian models is justified by the so-called 
Dutch book argument (see eg, De Finetti [15]). Can such a position be 
defended for belief modeling as in the case of probabilities? We refer the 
reader to Goodman, Nguyen, and Rogers [16]. We point out, however, a 
few interesting facts: First, note that, in his investigation of coherent 
uncertainty measures, DeFinetti [17] used implicitly the concept of mea- 
sure-free conditional events. The same phenomenon appeared in the work 
of Cox [18]. Second, Lindley [19] generalized DeFinetti's work by replacing 
the squared loss function by a more general score function in order to 
reaffirm that, in a sense, admissible uncertainty measures are functions of 
probability measures. Of course, a function of a probability need not be a 
probability! For example, if P is a probability measure, then p2 is no 
longer additive. However, p2 is a belief function! Thus, there are belief 
functions that are also coherent in Lindley's sense. This special belief 
function has the property that: 
p2(A)  --- ~p(P2(A)) 
where ~p: [0, 1] ~ [0, 1] 
q~(x) = 1 - 2V~- + x 
It turns out that if F is a belief function that is admissible in Lindley's 
sense, then necessarily VA _ O, F(A)  = O(F (A) )  for some function 0: 
[0, 1] --+ [0, 1]. If, in addition, ~ is differentiable, then the above necessary 
condition is also sufficient for admissibility. 
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The story is this: If one insists on the Dutch book argument for judging 
various types of uncertainty measures, then, like probabilities, there are 
indeed belief functions that are admissible. Whether inadmissible belief 
functions should not be used remains to be examined, because in fact, 
DeFinetti's and Lindley's schemes rely heavily on the assumption that 
aggregation functions are additive. Thus, if admissibility analysis is ex- 
tended to non-additive aggregation functions, then some uncertainty mea- 
sures will become admissible ven though they may not be transformable 
to a finitely additive probability measure (Goodman, Nguyen and Rogers 
[16]). 
5. EXPECTATION WITH RESPECT TO A BELIEF FUNCTION 
We consider now a generalized concept of expectation to show the 
cautious nature of belief modeling. To be concrete, we use the example at 
the end of section 4. Because the true probability measure P0 is specified 
only by Po(Oi)= ai, i=  1 . . . . .  n, the expected value Eeo(U) = 
Eu(O)Po({O}) is not known in general (except if the Oi's are the singletons 
of O), where u: O ~ ~ (the real line). Thus we might try to approximate 
Epo(U). It is well known that Epo(U) can be also written in another form, 
namely: 
Ep°(U) = fo P°(u > t) dt + [P0(u  > t) - 1] dt 
As pointed out in section 4, the belief function F(A) = Y~x c Am(X) 
where m(A)= {0i otherwiseifA=O/ 
is an approximation of P0, one can simply approximate Eeo(U) by replacing 
P0 by F in the above formula (that is, we consider the Choquet integral of 
u with respect o F), the resulting formula is denoted as EF(U). 
For O = {01 . . . . .  Ok}, we get (Smets [201): 
k 
Er (u)  = Y ' ,u (O?) [F ({O?  . . . . .  O~}) - F({O?+I . . . . .  0~})] 
j=l 
with the convention that {0j* 1 . . . . .  0~'} is empty when j = k, and where 01.*, 
j = 1 . . . . .  n, is a renaming of the 0j's according to the function u, ie, 
u(O~) <_ u(O~) < ... < u(Oi*). (Ties are ranked arbitrarily.) 
It is easy to check that the following function g (depending on F and on 
u, via the above permutation of the 0r's) is a probability density. 
g(Or* ) = F({0r* . . . . .  0~}) -F ({07 ,  . . . . .  Ok*}), j = 1,2 . . . .  k 
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Thus, Er(u) = Ee(u) where Pg is the probability measure associated with 
g, ie, 
P~(A) = Y'. g(O),  VA c_ ®. 
O~A 
Thus, we are led to use Ee(u) as an approximation for Eeo(u). Now, 
P0 = Pf0, where fo(O) = P0({0}), and f0 is known only to lie in the set of 
densities 3 -= {f: Pf(®i) = cti, i = 1, 2 . . . . .  n}. We claim that g e ~. In- 
deed, recall that g(Oj*) = Y'm(A), where the summation is over {A ___ O: 
0j* ~ A ___ {0j* . . . . .  0~'}}. 
We have Pg(O i) = Eo~o,g(O). In terms of the 07's, let j be the 
smallest index such that 0p ~ (9i. By construction of m, the only non-nul 
term is m({Oj* . . . .  }) = m(®i), so that P~(®i)= ai, Vi = 1,2 . . . . .  n. 
Moreover, for any f in ~,, we have Ee(u) < Eer(u). This can be seen as 
follows. Write: 
0o~ Ee1(u)= fo ei(u>t) dt+ f_ [eI(u>t)- lldt 
It is then sufficient o verify that Pg(u > t) < Pf(u > t), for any t real, and 
this fact follows simply from the construction of g. 
In summary, the Choquet integral of a function turns out to be the 
smallest expected value among all possible expected values in the model. 
This does reflect the cautious behavior of F as an approximation. 
6. DEMPSTER'S RULE OF CONDITIONING PRODUCES THE 
LEAST COMMITED CONDITIONAL BELIEF FUNCTION 
We turn now to a characterization of Dempster's rule of conditioning 
that is used as the dynamics component in the Transferable Belief Model 
(Smets [10]). 
Let O be a finite set and m: 2 ° ---, [0,1] such that Ex~_om(X) = 1. 
However, we suppose here that m(O)> 0. This corresponds to the 
"open world assumption" (Smets [5, 21]). The belief function bel defined 
by bel(A) = ~,Xc_Am(X)  is such that bel(®) < 1. Anyway, m is for- 
mally a probability density on 2 °. 
Let Pm be the probability measure on 22'~ with density m. If we let 
F(A) = Pro(2 A) then bel(A) = P,,(2 A) - Pm(2 e~) = F(A) - F(O) = P,,(2 a 
To define a conditional belief function of the form bel(AlB), we take 
the view in Giirdenfors [1] that "conditional beliefs are beliefs in condi- 
tionals," where by conditionals we mean mathematical conditional objects 
as outlined in section 2. 
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The problem is how to define formally the belief in A given B. Observe 
that (A IB)= [A n B, B U A] = (An  BIB), thus there is no loss of 
generality to assume always that in (AIB), A ___ B. To define the belief of 
(AIB), we suggest a generalization of Pro(2 A) into "P,,(2AIB) '' where AIB 
is a set of subset 2 °. As (AIB) = {A U X: X ___ B} is a set of subsets of 2 ° 
and for each subset A U X of 2 °, we know Pm(2Au x), so we can define 
Pm(2 AIn) as the set of probabilities on 2 ° such that: 
P,,(2 AIB) = {Pm(2Aux):  X g B}. 
So to obtain bel(A[B), one replaces A and O by A[B and Q[B in 
Pro(2 A - 2~). So: 
[P,,(2 AI8 - 2 ~IB) = {Pm(2 au x ) -- Pm(2r ) " X c_ B, Y c_ B} 
= {F(A  u X)  - f (V ) :  X _c r" _c 
Up to now, bel(A[B) is not uniquely defined. All we know is that m 
induces a set of possible values for bel(AlB), the set Pro(2 AIB - 2~lB). 
Because we require that bel(QlB) = 0, a subset of the above set, for 
which F(X)  = F(Y) ,  constitutes a collection of candidates for defining 
Bel(AIB). Note that, for a probabililty measure P on 2 °, as in section 2, 
the value Ps(A)  is assigned to the set {X e 20: A _ X ___ B U A} = (AIB). 
This value can be justified as a "canonical value" among the set of values 
{P(X): X ~ (AIB)} (see Goodman, Nguyen and Walker [3]). Here, F 
plays the role of P in a similar situation. A canonical value in the set of 
values {F(A U X)  - F(Y): X c__ B, Y c_ B, F (X)  = F(Y)} will be ex- 
tracted using the principle of minimal commitment. It happens to be 
different from the one used in section 2. It results from an extra principle 
that characterizes the cautious nature of the transferable belief model. 
Let us recall first the minimal commitment principle. Whenever one's 
knowledge leads to the conclusion that bel must be an element of some set 
~'  of belief functions, the principle of minimum commitment can be 
evoked in order to select the "best" representative of ,~'. The intuitive 
idea behind the principle is: "don't give to A more belief than justified" or 
"don't give to A less plausibility than justified." The principle corresponds 
to an ordering of two belief functions bel~ and bel2on f~ such that bel I is 
less committed than bel 2 if: 
VA g 12 bell( A ) + m1(0  ) < bel2( A ) + m2(O )
where the rni(Q) terms might be non-null when working under open world 
assumption. This principle is equivalent to: 
VA c_~ pl~(A) >_ple(A ) . 
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In Smets [7], we indicate the origin of this requirement and explain among 
other things why the ordering based on VA ___ 1-/ bell(A) < bel2(A) might 
be inappropriate when ml(Q) or m2(O) are positive. 
We define VA c 1-/; b(A)  = bet(A)  + m(O) .  
So now our problem to define bel(AIB) is to see if there is a unique least 
commited element in Pro(2 AIB -- 2 OIB) and if so, which one? 
We are going to show that the element F(A  U B) - F(B) is a belief 
function (in A, for fixed B), which is the least commited among the 
elements of the above subclass. Note that F(A  U B) - F(B) is the belief 
function obtained by Dempster's rule of conditioning. 
For all X ___ B, Y c_ B such that F(X)  = F(Y) ,  let belfrY(A) = F (A  u 
X)  - F(Y) .  (5) 
Let bXY(A)  = belXY(A) + mXY(f~) 
For any belief function bel, one has bel(fD = 1 - m(O). So it is also true 
for every bel xY. Thus mXY((~) = 1 - belfrY(B). 
So bXY(A)  = belfrY(A) + 1 - belfrY(B) 
= F(A  U X)  - F (Y )  + 1 - F (B  U X)  + F (Y )  (6) 
where belfrY(A) and belfrY(B) are two values (those for sets A and B) of 
the same element belfr Y in Pro(2 AIB -- 2OI8) .  
Hence bXY(A)  = 1 - F (B  U X)  + F (A  U X) .  
Now F(B  U X)  - F (A  U X)  is an increasing function of X, that is: 
F( B U X ' )  - F(  A U X ' )  - F(  B U X)  + F(  A U X)  >0 
LEMMA For any A c_ B c_ 1~, 
X ' )  - F (B  U X)  + F (A  U X)  
Proof Let X ___ X'  ___ B, and 
subsets relevant here: A, B n z~ 
a = bet(A)  = 
c = bel( B n A)  = 
x = bet (X)  = 
y = bet(X'  n ~)  = 
vx  c_x' c_B. 
any XGX'  c_B, F (BUX' ) -F (A  U 
>0.  
let the belief given to the four distinct 
X and X'  n X. 
Y'~m(P): O :~ P ___A 
Y'~m(Q): Q 4: Q __c_B nA  
~. ,m(R) :Q  ¢ R c__X 
~m(S) :O  #= S cX '  (~2 
Let ac(ax, ay, cx, cy, xy) denote the sum of the basic belief masses rn given 
to subesets of A U (B n .xT) (A u X, .A  u (X'  n ,~) . . .  ) that have non- 
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empty intersection both with A and B N A(A  and X, A and X' n X . . . .  ) 
ac= Y ' .m(PUQ) : f~4:Pc_A ,O~Qc_BNX 
ax= ~m(PuQ) :Q34:Pc_A ,  Q4=Qc_X 
Let acx(acy, axy, cxy) denote the sum of the basic belief masses m given to 
subsets of A U (B n A) u X (A u X u (X '  n .~) , . . . )  that have non- 
empty intersection with A, B n X and X (A, X and X'  n .~ . . . .  ) 
acx= ~_ ,m(PUQUR) 'O- - /=Pc_A ,Q4=Qc_BNX,  f~4=Rc_X 
Let acxy denote the sum of the basic belief masses m given to subsets of 
A U (B n A) u X u (X '  N .~) that have non-empty intersection with A, 
Bn~XandX'n .~:  
acxy= Y ' .m(PUQURuS) :Q4=PcA,O4=Qc_BNX, (~ 
~ R c_X,Q--/= S c_X'  nX  
Beware ac, ax, acx, acxy are not products but just symbols to denote sums. 
The notation enhances which sets are involved. 
With these components one can define the needed F values with: 
F(  B U X ' )  =F(•)  + a + c + x + y + ac + ax + ay + cx + cy 
+ xy + acx + acy + axy + cxy + acxy 
F(  A U X ' )  =F(Q)  + a + x + y + ax + ay + xy + axy 
F(  B U X)  = F (Q)  + a + c + x + ac + ax + cx + acx 
F(  A O X)  = F(f~) + a + x + ax 
So 
F(BUX' )  - F (A  UX ' )  - F (BUX)  + F (A  UX)  
= cy + acx + cxy + acxy > O. QED 
As bXV(A)  = 1 - F (B  U X)  + F (A  U X) ,  bXY(A)  is minimal when X is 
maximal in its domain ie, when X = B. So we use X = B. 
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THEOREM The belief unction bel(AIB) that is minimally commited in 
Pro(2 AI" - 2 ~IB) is obtained when bel(AIB) is computed by Dempster's 
rule of conditioning. 
Proof By the previous lemma, we already know that the minimal 
solution for b~Y(A) is obtained when X = B. So we use X = B. 
Further, for any belief function, bel(@) = 0. So belgr(@) = O. 
By (6): bffr(O) = bel~r(@) + 1 - bel~r(B) 
= F(B)  - F (Y )  + 1 - F (B  U B) + F (Y )  
By (5) bel~V(B) = F (B  U B) - F (Y )  = F (B  U B) - F (B)  
Then bffr( A)  = belgV( A)  + 1 - belgV( B) 
= belgV(A) + 1 - F (B  U B) + F (B)  
= 1-F (BUB)  +F(A  UB)  
Therefore bel~r( A)  = F( A U B) - F( B).  
This. definition is independent of Y. Hence there is a unique solution for 
bel(AIB),_namely F (A  U B) - F(B). As F (X)  = bel(X) + m(O), F (A  u 
B) - F(B) = bel(A U B) - bel(B), and bel(AlB) = bel(A u B) - bel(B), 
ie, Dempster's rule of conditioning. QED 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we discussed some possible usage of measure-free condi- 
tional objects in the context of belief dynamics. In particular, given the set 
of conditional belief functions Pro(2 Aw - 2 ° 18) generated by a conditional 
object (AIB), the least commited solution for P,~(2 AIB - 2 °18) is bel(AIB) 
= bel(A u B) - bel(B), the unnormalized Dempster's rule of condition- 
ing described in the transferable belief model. This derivation provides a 
justification for the use of Dempster's rule of conditioning in the transfer- 
able belief model (Smets [22]). 
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